We study a large data set of stock portfolios held by individuals and organizations in the Swedish stock market. The dividend yields on these portfolios are systematically related to investors' relative tax preferences for dividends versus capital gains. Taxneutral investors earn 40 basis points higher dividend yield on their portfolios than investors which face higher effective taxation of dividends than capital gains. We conclude that there are dividend tax clienteles in the market. We also argue that the abundant portfolio holdings by closely-held corporations, despite triple taxation at a combined marginal tax rate as high as 77.5%, is a consequence of taxation.
Introduction
Corporations pay dividends and investors pay taxes on these dividends. Investors also pay taxes on capital gains when they sell their shares, but they can choose when to do so. Some investors are tax neutral, and other pay taxes on dividends but not on capital gains. Theory suggests that investors can reduce the overall tax bill by sorting themselves into clienteles in which lowtax investors collect the dividends and high-tax investors realize capital gains. 1 Understanding how the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains influences investors' stock portfolios has implications for the pricing of financial securities, for corporations issuing securities, and for governments collecting taxes.
There is a large literature that examines the tax clientele hypothesis with indirect measures.
One strand of the literature examines the price and volume patterns around the ex-dividend day. Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the patterns of ex-dividend day returns are consistent with tax clienteles in the stock market, while Kalay (1982) and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) challenge this interpretation. 2 A second strand relates stock returns and dividend yields. A return premium on high-yield stocks would induce low-tax investors to hold high-yield stocks and high-tax investors to hold low-yield stocks. Several studies run cross-sectional regressions of returns on dividend yields, but reach different conclusions (see, for example, Black and Scholes (1974) , Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) , Miller and Scholes (1982) ). A third strand of the literature examines institutional ownership. Del Guercio (1996) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that institutions prefer dividend-paying stocks, and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) and Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1999) document changes in institutional ownership around dividend initiations and omissions. These studies are often inconclusive on tax effects because the tax status of institutional investors cannot be determined.
There are also direct tests of the tax clientele hypothesis. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlar-1 See, for example, Miller and Modigliani (1961) , Brennan (1970) , Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) , and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) . 2 The core of the critique is that investors with different marginal tax rates trade around the ex-dividend day until prices reflect transaction costs rather than tax rates. Trading would mitigate the need for forming tax clienteles, but the evidence suggests that relatively small amounts of stocks are traded, usually less than 1% of the stock (see, for instance, Michaely and Vila (1996) ).
baum (1977) and Pettit (1977) study the stock portfolios of 2,500 individual investors from a retail brokerage house. Both studies relate dividend yields to proxies for marginal tax rates, but reach opposite conclusions. Scholz (1992) looks at self-reported data by 4,000 individuals in the Survey of Consumer Finances and finds evidence consistent with dividend tax clienteles. Most recently, Graham and Kumar (2006) report that high-age, low-income individuals invest more in high-yield stocks using a data set of 60,000 individual investors. These studies suffer from two weaknesses:
Data include small subsets of individuals and no organizations, which own most shares, and the marginal tax rate of individuals is difficult to estimate.
We study the tax clientele hypothesis using stock ownership data from Sweden. The data set is comprehensive; it includes more than 34,000 stock portfolios held by organizations and two million stock portfolios by individuals. The tax structure is ideal for estimating tax clientele effects: Tax rates are flat and variation across investors arises mainly from different tax treatments of organizations. There are three tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market. First, individuals are taxed at the 30% rate and businesses at the 28% rate. These investors prefer capital gains over dividends because tax on capital gains can be postponed. Second, many organizations such as Government entities, insurance companies, charities, and pension funds are tax neutral. Relative to individuals and businesses, tax-neutral investors prefer dividends. Third, the taxation of investment funds is asymmetric: Dividends pass through and are taxed by the recipient, while capital gains accrue tax free within the fund. This means that investment funds have a stronger preference for capital gains over dividends than any of the other investors. In this tax environment we provide the following main results:
• Tax-neutral investors earn higher dividend yields on their portfolios than businesses, individuals, and investment funds. The difference is large; tax-neutral investors earn 40 basis points higher dividend yield on their portfolios than investment funds.
• More than 28,000 stock portfolios are held by corporations despite that income on such portfolios is subject to triple taxation. We argue that the existence of these portfolios is a consequence of taxation.
We conclude that there are dividend tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market. This result is not a priori obvious. Shareholders trade off taxes against diversification, and a plausible null hypothesis is that the benefits of portfolio diversification swamp the benefits from reducing the tax bill. 3 The finding of tax clientele effects in the Swedish stock market adds to a broader tax literature, which examines the trade off between taxes and risk-taking across asset classes (see Poterba and Samwick (2002) and references). For example, the formation of tax clienteles across stocks and bonds is central to the capital structure theory of Miller (1977) . 4 If there are tax clientele effects in the stock market, where the benefits of diversification ought to be the strongest, then tax clienteles are also likely to form across assets where the diversification benefits are weaker. 5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the relevant details of the Swedish tax code. Descriptive statistics for the sample stock portfolios and the empirical results are reported in Section 3. The curious phenomenon of corporations that hold stock portfolios is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and points to directions for future research. Table 1 . The two top rows present that the number of firms varies between 254 and 288 per year and the market capitalization between SEK 1,760 and 2,802 billion. 6 The rest of the table provides statistics on dividends. Dividends are paid annually after the approval of the shareholder meeting. Approximately 50% of the listed firms pay dividends, but the market value of the dividend-paying firms is more than 80% of market capitalization.
3 Miller and Scholes (1978) propose the hypothesis that investors can offset dividend tax liability entirely by borrowing to purchase the stock portfolio and deduct the dividends against the interest rate payments on the loan. Whether such tax avoidance strategies are being used depends on the investor's tolerance towards the risk of the levered stock portfolio.
4 See also Auerbach and King (1983) who extend Miller's (1977) model of tax tradeoffs to also include risk. 5 For example, the persistent spread in bond yields between regular treasury securities and tax-exempt municipal bonds suggests that there are tax clienteles in the bond market where the benefits from diversification are smaller than in the stock market (see, for example, pages 340-345 in Sundaresan (2002) ).
6 The SEK/USD exchange rate has varied between 6.5 and 10.5 during the sample period. We obtain ten cross-sections of stock ownership for June and December each year in 2001-2005, but will in the empirical work use annual cross-sections (the June record). Each record displays the name of the shareholder, an organization identification number, the number of shares held, and a security identification code. The formation of individual stock portfolios can be based on the organization number for organizations and the name for individuals and proprietorships for whom the identification numbers have been omitted. The foreign stock portfolios are eliminated, because we do not know the identity of the beneficial owner of shares in custody.
With the data from Thomson Financial we compute factor loadings (betas) in one and three factor regression models and idiosyncratic risks as the standard deviations of the residuals from the same regressions. The betas capture exposures to the market, high-minus-low book-to-market ratios (HML), and small-minus-big market capitalization (SMB). We also consider two liquidity variables, turnover rate (total trading in a stock relative its market capitalization) and spread (bid-ask spread in relation to its price), obtained from the Stockholm Stock Exchange. We further collect information on a firm's use of dual class shares and whether individuals holdings in a firm's shares are exempt from a wealth tax, or not. These data are later used to capture dimensions beyond taxes that may be important for investors' portfolio holdings. Capital loss on stock is fully deductible against capital gains on other stocks, but only 70% against other investment income. Negative investment income can also offset tax liability on ordinary income. The tax reduction is 30% times the deficit up to SEK 100,000 and 21% times the deficit above SEK 100,000. This means that capital loss saves taxes at rates 30% (gains on stock), 21% (investment income, ordinary income up to the limit), and 14.7% (ordinary income above the limit).
Taxation of Dividends and Capital Gains
10 Morck (2005) documents similar tax rules in most developed countries except the US where intercorporate dividends are taxed for the explicit reason to discourage the formation of business groups.
• Life insurance companies and pension funds: Income is defined as the average treasury rate during the year times the market value of the stock portfolio in the beginning of the year.
The tax rate on imputed income is 15%.
• Banks and brokerage houses: Stocks can be held only for trading purposes. Income is defined as the change in the market value of the inventory (mark-to-market principle). The tax rate is 28%.
In the next group of business organizations, income passes through to the owners:
• Investment funds: Dividends pass through and are taxed as investment income by the recipients. Capital gains accrue tax free within the fund. Fund owners pay capital gains tax when they sell shares in the fund. These tax rules mean that short-term trading profits for the fund are transformed into long-term trading profits for the investor. This tax benefit comes at the expense of a tax on the net asset value of the stock portfolio similar to the taxation of life insurance companies and pension funds.
• Partnerships: Income from a stock portfolio passes through and is taxed as ordinary income by the partners. The transformation of investment income into ordinary income discourages individuals from owning stock through a partnership as the marginal tax rate on ordinary income (67.2%) is much higher than that on investment income (30%). For a business partner the transformation makes no difference as the tax rate is 28% in either case.
• Sole proprietorships: Income from a stock portfolio passes through and is taxed by the proprietor as investment income (30% rate). Stock clubs are taxed this way.
Government Entities, Charities, and Non-Profits. Government entities are exempt from taxation. Charitable organizations are exempt from taxation of investment income. Other nonprofit organizations are taxed as businesses (see above).
Tax Preferences
Let τ d and τ g be the marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains, respectively. We compute the relative tax preference for dividends over capital gains for all investors and identify three tax clienteles, sorted from high to low:
1.00 A. Tax Life insurance companies, pension funds, banks, government entities, and charities are tax neutral.
Life insurance, pension funds, and banks are tax neutral, because they are taxed on imputed income. Tax-neutral investors have the strongest relative preference for dividends, businesses and individuals fall somewhere in between, and investment funds have the strongest relative preference for capital gains. In equation (1) and what follows, we ignore the small difference in marginal tax rates between businesses and individuals and assume it is 30%. The numerical value for businesses and individuals depends on the value of deferral of capital gains tax. Bailey (1969) estimates the value of deferral to 50% of the statutory rate, Protopapadakis (1983) finds estimates in the order of 25%, and Chay, Choi, and Pontiff (2006) find it to be 55%. 11 Green and Hollifield (2003) model the advantage of deferral and find numerically that the effective tax rate on capital gains amounts to approximately 60% of the statutory rate. In equation (1), we apply the numerical result of Green and Hollifield (2003) , so that τ g = 0.60 × 30% = 18%.
The pass-through tax treatment of stock income from partnerships and investment funds means that tax preferences depend on the identities of partners and fund owners. In equation (1) we include investment funds and exclude partnerships. The asymmetric treatment of the two organizations is based on the belief that investment funds are primarily owned by individuals, while partnerships 11 Much of the US literature assumes that the effective capital gains tax rate is 25% of the statutory rate (e.g., Graham (2003) ). This is based on Bailey (1969) , who multiplies the estimated value of deferral 50% with the estimated value of the option to reset the cost basis to the market value at death, which is also 50%. We do not follow this approach because the Swedish tax code does not allow the estate to reset the cost basis to market values at death (see above).
may have individual as well as institutional partners. 12 Without information on the ownership structure, we think that the inclusion of partnerships only adds noise. Mutual funds also manage tax-deferred accounts for individuals under the Premium Pension Authority (PPM). We ignore this ambiguity about the tax status of investment funds, because the new pension system that started in 2000 is relatively small.
The calculations in (1) assume that investors have taxable income. If investors can offset dividends and capital gains against capital losses, the relative tax preferences change somewhat. Loss deductions are irrelevant for tax-neutral organizations and investment funds. Businesses become tax neutral, while individuals still prefer dividends as a result of loss limitations (see footnote 9).
We assume that investors make long-term investments and ignore the possibility that businesses and individuals may want to re-balance their portfolios when they have capital losses.
Identification of Investor Tax Preferences
Statistics Sweden classifies organizations by a two-digit code for organizational form, which we use to sort investors into tax clienteles. The organization code was originally created to facilitate the exchange of information in the public sector. The tax administration uses the code to distribute the appropriate tax form to each organization. Table 2 For the five organizations with ambiguous tax status, the name uniquely identifies life insurance (A), property and casualty insurance (B), pension funds (A), and closed-end funds (C).
Brokerage houses (A) are identified by the register of the Swedish Association of Stock Brokers, and controlling shares (A) by the 10% and 25% ownership cutoffs. Non-profit organizations must file a tax return each year. The local tax officer decides whether the organization is charitable and qualifies for tax-exempt investment income (A) or the organization is subject business tax-ation (B). We classify non-profit organizations with charitable-related names as tax exempt (A) and non-profit organizations with names related to a specific group of people as businesses (B).
Foundations are harder to classify than associations as they are typically named after the donor.
A few scientific foundations (A) are well-known to the authors. Foundations with a relationship to a business are classified as taxed (B). The name method classifies 88% of the associations and 29% of the foundations. Non-classified non-profit organizations are not considered.
Empirical Results
We evaluate the tax effects in the cross-sections of stock portfolios. The data set is less suitable for time-series analysis, so we do not report any results relating to clientele shifts around dividend initiations and omissions or new stock listings and delistings.
Aggregate Investors' Portfolios
The starting point of our analysis is the Capital Asset Pricing Model extended with taxes by Brennan (1970) , Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) , and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) .
In these models, if investors are sufficiently risk averse, the tax effects are negligible and investors hold approximately equal shares of all stocks in the market portfolio. This is our null hypothesis, which we evaluate against the alternative that tax-neutral investors (A) tilt their portfolios towards dividend-paying stocks, that investment funds (C) tilt their portfolios away from dividend-paying stocks, and that businesses and individuals (B) fall somewhere between the two extremes.
To test these hypotheses, we construct the aggregate stock portfolios of all investors that belong to tax clientele k = A, B, C. Table 3 presents summary statistics of variables averaged over the years in the sample. Consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis, the dividend yield on the tax neutral portfolio (A) is higher than the dividend yield on the portfolio of business and individuals (B) which, in turn, is higher than the dividend yield on the portfolio of investment funds (C). The yield spread between tax-neutral portfolios (A) and investment funds (C) is 40 basis points. The aggregate stock portfolio of tax-neutral investors (A) has the largest weight in dividend-paying stocks, but the weight of businesses and individuals (B) falls below that of investment funds (C).
There are more than two million stock portfolios with a combined market share of 64%. Businesses and individuals own 93.2% of all stock portfolios, but their market share is only 21.4%. Foreign investors own 33.9%. The foreign stock portfolio earns the lowest dividend yield. Unclassified investors include associations and foundations with unknown tax status, domestic organizations with unknown type, and partnerships. The insignificant market share of partnerships, less than 0.05%, is consistent with tax incentives which discourage individuals from holding stocks through partnership.
For each tax clientele k, we compute the percentage ownership fraction F k jt in firm j in year t, and estimate a pooled cross-section, time-series, linear regression model of the ownership fraction on a dividend dummy variable D jt , which equals one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise, and a set of firm-specific control variables X jt :
The δ k parameter captures, conditional on the firm characteristics X jt , the over-or under-weighting in dividend-paying stocks of clientele k. Under the null hypothesis that the aggregate investors hold equal market shares across firms, the coefficients of the dividend dummy are all zero. The alternative hypothesis predicts that the coefficients can be sorted according to tax preferences:
The regression is equally-weighted which is correct under the null hypothesis that the ownership fractions are equal across firms. The regression does not include a dummy variable for share repurchases, because the tax consequences are the same for share repurchase and zero payout. The general study of payout policy may offer different implications for dividend-paying and repurchasing firms, but analyzing these differences is outside the scope of our paper.
The regression results are reported in Table 4 These differences are also statistically significant.
Missing control variables may explain the mixed evidence for the tax clientele hypothesis. For example, investment funds may be bound to a diversification strategy which forces them to stay close to the market portfolio. Swedish index funds have no choice but to hold the market portfolio and, by construction, the largest investment funds cannot deviate much from the market portfolio.
The five largest investment funds hold together more than 10% of the stock market capitalization.
Businesses and individuals are small and have no commitment to diversify across stocks.
Individual Investors' Portfolios

Descriptive Statistics
The aggregate statistics in the previous section hide significant investor heterogeneity. Table 5 presents averages of portfolio characteristics for major investor types. In addition to the organizations in Table 2 above, we have classified corporations as widely-held if the firm itself or the parent of the business group to which the firm belongs is registered in the securities depository, or as closely-held if the firm or the parent is outside the securities depository. The intercorporate ownership structure is taken from the database Market Manager.
The variation in average portfolio size across investor types is noticeable. Life insurance companies hold the largest portfolios with almost 50 stocks. Closed-end funds are also very large, but they hold only 10 stocks. Mutual funds, non-life insurance companies, the public sector, and banks hold medium size portfolios with approximately 20 stocks. Pension funds, charities, and non-profits hold smaller portfolios with less than 10 stocks. We only consider investors' direct investments in domestic stocks and do not have information on the number of foreign stocks they hold. Adding the foreign stocks would most likely increase the number of stocks held by mutual funds and pension funds.
The smallest portfolios are held by closely-held firms and individuals with only three stocks.
The small number of directly owned stocks in individuals' portfolios is also a striking feature of the Survey of Consumer Finances (see Polkovnichenko (2005) The variation in the risk characteristics across investor types is noticeable. Large stock portfolios held by institutional investors are tilted towards stocks with high dividend yield and high bookto-market ratios (small negative HML coefficients). Small stock portfolios held by closely-held corporations display the opposite traits. They are tilted towards stocks with low dividend yield and low book-to-market ratios (large negative HML coefficients). Estates and stock clubs also follow this investment strategy. We report the frequency distribution of the HML betas, the number of stocks, and the portfolio values in Figures 1-3 . The distributions are displayed for each tax clientele, where clientele B is further divided into B1 (Businesses) and B2 (Individuals). There is a striking tendency for businesses to hold stocks with low HML betas. The dominance of few stocks in portfolios held by businesses and individuals is also apparent, as is the higher portfolio values for investment funds.
Regression Results
The individual stock portfolio data described above are significantly different from the predictions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Regressing individual ownership fractions on a set of explanatory variables is also statistically difficult. For example, the many single-stock portfolios would appear with the portfolio weight of 100% in one stock and 0% in all other stocks. Instead, we follow the approach of Pettit (1977) , Scholz (1992) , and Graham and Kumar (2006) and define the portfolio dividend yield as the dependent variable. The idea is that preferences, beliefs, and budget constraints determine the optimal portfolios, which are associated with a dividend yield. Under the null hypothesis that tax effects are negligible, the dividend yield should be equal across investors with different tax preferences. The tax clientele hypothesis, on the other hand, implies that the average dividend yield is higher for tax-neutral portfolios than for investment funds, and that the dividend yields on business and individual portfolios fall somewhere between the two extremes.
For each investor i in year t, we compute the dividend yield Y it and estimate a pooled crosssection, time-series, linear regression model of the dividend yield on dummy variables D k it for each ownership of individuals, businesses, and non-profit organizations.
tax clientele and a set of control variables X it :
The tax clientele hypothesis implies that:
We also estimate a regression where we replace the tax clientele dummies with the tax preference parameter θ it for each investor i in year t:
For this specification, the tax clientele hypothesis predicts that γ > 0.
We report the results from estimating regression models (4) and (6) without the stock portfolios of individuals. The characteristics of individuals' stock portfolios are markedly different from those of organizations (see Table 5 above). Adding more than two million stock portfolios to an equallyweighted regression means that the coefficients of the control variables, but not the tax variables, are determined by the characteristics of the average individual's stock portfolio. In the next sub-section we comment on the regression results when individuals' portfolios are included.
The main regression results are reported in Table 6 using 164,743 investor-year observations.
Three specifications refer to regression model (4) and two to (6). The tax clientele dummies enter with negative signs and the tax preference parameter with a positive sign. All coefficients are statistically different from zero. In specification (1a), the coefficients of businesses (B) are more negative than the coefficient of investment funds (C). This result mimics those on aggregate portfolio data above. In specifications (1b) and (1c), the coefficients of the tax clientele dummies are nicely sorted according to tax preferences (5). The magnitudes are economically meaningful.
The yield spread between A and C is in the order of the unconditional average 40 basis points.
Consistent with Pettit (1977) , dividend yield decreases with market beta and, as in Graham and Kumar (2006) , dividend yield increases with HML beta and decreases with idiosyncratic risk.
Robustness
The bottom of Table 6 presents that 29.9% of the portfolios are clustered at a zero dividend yield.
This means the coefficients in a linear model may predict negative dividend yields. We examine the sensitivity to the clustering at zero by trimming the sample (Table 7) and by estimating a Tobit model (Table 8 ). Since zero-yield portfolios are most common among investors with only a few stocks, we expect that the problem is the most critical for the estimation of the coefficients of businesses (B).
The left panel in Table 7 excludes portfolios with less than five stocks, the middle panel portfolios with a market value below SEK 250,000, and the right panel portfolios of businesses (B). The number of observations and the percentages of zeros decrease dramatically. In all three panels the signs of the coefficients are the same as in the full sample. The magnitude of the coefficients for investment funds (C) is about the same, while the coefficients for businesses (B) are smaller.
The estimation of the Tobit model in Table 8 conveys similar results to those using trimmed samples. The top panel reports the estimated coefficients with standard errors. The bottom panel evaluates the differences in expected yield spreads due to differences in relative tax preferences at the averages of the control variables for tax-neutral investors. 15 The resulting yield spreads are similar to those reported in Table 7 . One tax coefficient is positive, but not statistically different from zero. In sum, the portfolios held by tax-neutral investors present a robust significant difference in dividend yields relative investment funds, whereas the differences relative portfolios held by businesses are sensitive to the empirical specification.
Many variables can influence investors' portfolio choices. Above, we control for investors' risk preferences, but we have also examined two liquidity variables, turnover rate and bid-ask spread. 
Corporate Stock Portfolios
More than 28,000 portfolios are held by closely-held corporations (see Table 5 ). The average dividend yield on these portfolios is low (1.45%), average portfolio size is small (SEK 2.1 million), and the portfolios are tilted toward growth stocks as suggested by the low average HML betas (-1.03). Why do corporations buy growth stocks? We propose a tax-based explanation.
Special tax rules pertain to income from a closely-held corporation, where the owner (or his relatives) is also employed. The purpose of these rules is to tax labor income the same way regardless of whether it is earned directly as wages or channeled through a partnership or a corporation. The marginal tax rate on wages and partnership income is 67.2%, and the marginal tax rate on dividends from a closely-held corporation is 68.7%. 17 These rules imply that a dividend on a stock portfolio that passes through to its final owner is subject to triple taxation at a marginal tax rate of 77.5%.
The taxation of capital gains from selling shares in the closely-held firm is more favorable. A capital gain which exceeds approximately SEK eight million is taxed as investment income at the 30% rate. 18 Repurchase of its own shares are not allowed for a closely-held firm.
Corporations may hold a liquid stock portfolio for future investments in operating assets. Corporations may also hold stocks to offset pension liabilities for the employees. However, we speculate that many corporate stock portfolios in our data serve as supplemental retirement accounts for the owners. A portfolio of growth stocks does not trigger any taxes before the owner sells the closelyheld firm. Saving for retirement through a stock portfolio held by the firm has the advantage that the portfolio can be liquidated at any time and used for other purposes than retirement. This benefit must be weighted against the advantage of private pension and deferred compensation plans, which are protected by the limited liability of the corporation. 19 The data support the retirement hypothesis. Using data from Market Manager, we compute the ratio of the market value of the stock portfolio to the book value of total assets for financial and non-financial firms, respectively.
Most financial firms are securities trading companies, while the non-financial firms span manufacturing, construction, trade, and service. Table 9 presents the distribution of the ratio. Since we are mixing market and book values, the ratio sometimes exceeds 100%. Most important, the ratio exceeds 50% in more than 3,000 non-financial firms, which are better characterized as closely-held stock funds than as operating firms. Investment-fund tax status (C) does not apply to closely-held firms.
Conclusions
We conclude that there are dividend tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market. The main supporting piece of evidence is the dividend yield spread between tax neutral stock portfolios (A) and investment funds (C). Theoretically, this is where we expect to find the strongest tax effect and the estimated yield spread in the order of 40 basis points is economically meaningful. The ambiguous ordering of business portfolios (B) is less supportive. In some econometric specifications, the av-18 A capital gain below SEK eight million is taxed as half investment income (30% rate) and half ordinary income (56.6% rate).
19 Social security is the basis for retirement in Sweden. Payments to private pension plans and deferred compensation plans are made after social security taxes, but before ordinary income tax. The maximum before-tax amount is SEK 39,300 per year for private pension plans and SEK 394,000 for deferred compensation plans. Accordingly, the stock portfolio has the additional advantages that there is no upper limit and social security taxes must not be paid.
erage business portfolio sorts nicely between the average tax-neutral portfolio and the investment fund, but in other specifications, the business portfolios exhibit stronger dividend aversion than investment funds. Empirically, we cannot tell whether businesses choose high growth stocks with low dividend yield, because the owners of those businesses like growth stocks or because the business owners want to avoid taxes. The abundance of portfolios of closely-held corporations that invest in low-yield, growth stocks suggests that the owners of many business portfolios want to avoid taxes.
Then, the empirical results relating to the tax clientele hypothesis are ambiguous, because we fail to properly control for the business owners' time preferences for growth stocks which, in turn, are related to the business owners' particular tax position.
We have studied the portfolio implications of the asymmetric taxation of dividends and capital gains in Sweden. While some feature of the Swedish tax code are specific, we believe that the two main tax asymmetries are general. First, businesses and individuals (B) prefer capital gains over dividends as a result of the realization principle. The alternative, the mark-to-market principle, is less common. Second, Swedish investment funds (C) prefer tax-free capital gains over taxed dividends. We think this is a common tax treatment of investment funds in many countries, albeit not in the US. International stock portfolios are often taxed on dividends but not on capital gains.
For example, a US pension fund that purchases Swedish stocks is subject to 15% withholding tax on dividends but 0% tax on capital gains. If US pension funds together with other institutional investors that are subject to similar tax treatment dominate the aggregate foreign stock portfolio, then the low dividend yield on the foreign stock portfolio is additional evidence of tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market (see Table 3 ). This is a conjecture. The composition of cross-border equity flows is a topic for future research. Tax form: Individuals (1), businesses (2), charities and non-profits (3), and partnerships (4). Tax status based on equation (1): Tax neutral (A), businesses and individuals (B), investment funds (C). Name-based classification: Tax neutral (A) if the organization name contains words associated with children, animal protection, nature, religion, scientific, education, defense, museum, sports, arts, music, culture, political party, and health care; Business taxation (B) if the organization name contains words associated with business activity, labor union, stock club, employee profit plan, and social club, or the association is named after a person or family. The table presents the results of pooled least square regressions of percentage ownership fraction on firm characteristics over [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The dividend dummy equals one if a firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise. The betas are the factor loadings in a market model regression or in a three factor model regression (market; high-minus-low book-to-market ratio, HML, or value-minus-growth; small-minus-big market capitalization, SMB). Idiosyncratic risk is the (annualized) standard deviation of the residuals from the same regressions. Standard errors based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are reported in parenthesis. The adjusted R-squares in the regressions are reported in %. N is the total number of observations available. The table presents the characteristics of portfolios held by investors in different tax clienteles. The averages are equally weighted over all investors and all years. Portfolio values are expressed in SEK million. The betas are the factor loadings in a three factor regression model (market; high-minus-low book-to-market ratio, HML, or value-minus-growth; small-minus-big market capitalization, SMB) and idiosyncratic risk is the (annualized) standard deviation of the residuals from the same regression reported in %. Dividend yields, portfolio weights in dividend-paying stock, and market shares are reported in %. The table presents the results of pooled least square regressions of dividend yield on portfolio characteristics over [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The stock portfolios of individuals are excluded. Theta is defined as in expression (1). The betas are the factor loadings in a market model regression or in a three factor model regression (market; high-minus-low book-to-market ratio, HML, or value-minus-growth; small-minus-big market capitalization, SMB). Idiosyncratic risk is the (annualized) standard deviation of the residuals from the same regressions. Standard errors based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are reported in parenthesis. The adjusted R-squares in the regressions are reported in %. N is the total number of observations available; N 0 is the number of observations with zero dividend yield expressed in % of total number of observations. The stock portfolios of individuals are excluded. Specifications 1b, 3b, and 5b only include portfolios with five holding or more; specification 1c, 3c, and 5c only include portfolios with a market value of SEK 250,000 or more; specification 1d, 3d, and 5d only include tax clienteles A and C. Theta is defined as in expression (1). The betas are the factor loadings in a market model regression or in a three factor model regression (market; high-minus-low book-to-market ratio, HML, or value-minus-growth; small-minus-big market capitalization, SMB). Idiosyncratic risk is the (annualized) standard deviation of the residuals from the same regressions. Standard errors based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are reported parenthesis. The adjusted R-squares in the regressions are reported in %. N is the total number of observations available; N 0 is the number of observations with zero dividend yield expressed in % of total number of observations. (1). The betas are the factor loadings in a market model regression or in a three factor model regression (market; high-minus-low book-to-market ratio, HML, or valueminus-growth; small-minus-big market capitalization, SMB). Idiosyncratic risk is the (annualized) standard deviation of the residuals from the same regressions. Standard errors based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are reported in parenthesis. The pseudo R-squares (reported in %) are the squared correlations between predicted and observed dividend yields. N is the total number of observations available; N 0 is the number of observations with zero dividend yield expressed in % of total number of observations. The lower part of the table presents how the expected dividend yield on portfolios held by tax-exempt investors (clientele A) differs from the yields on other portfolios. The expected yields are calculated conditional on the typical characteristics of portfolios held by tax-exempt investors. Standard errors, calculated from the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix in the Tobit estimation, are reported in parenthesis. The figure displays percent frequency histograms of the number of stocks in portfolios held by tax clienteles A-C. Clientele B is further divided into B1 (Businesses) and B2 (Individuals).
